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I
In the account of ‘the brief history of the development of his thought’ inserted by the
editor into the ‘Preface to the Sixth Edition’ of The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick
stated that his ‘first adhesion to a definite Ethical system was to the Utilitarianism of
[John Stuart] Mill’, and went on to refer to his ‘discipleship to Mill’. As well as Mill,
other philosophers who figure prominently in ‘the brief history’ are Aristotle, Joseph
Butler, and Immanuel Kant. Jeremy Bentham is mentioned but once in passing.1 Yet
Bentham appears to have played a much more important role in Sidgwick’s thought
than is suggested by ‘the brief history’. There is little doubt that Sidgwick read
Bentham seriously. It is clear from Sidgwick’s references and allusions that he studied
significant parts of the Bowring edition of Bentham’s Works,2 including A Fragment
on Government (1776), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(printed 1780, published 1789), ‘Political Tactics’ (written 1788–9), Plan of
Parliamentary Reform (1817), and Constitutional Code (partly published 1830). He
also studied Bentham’s posthumous Deontology (1834), which Bowring edited, but
which was condemned by John Stuart Mill as an inadequate account of Bentham’s
1 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn., London, 1907 (the first edition appeared in 1874),
pp. xvi–xxiii.
2 The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, 11 vols., Edinburgh, 1843 [hereafter Bowring].
Under the terms of Bentham’s will (reproduced in J.E. Crimmins, ed., Bentham’s Auto-Icon and related
writings, Bristol, 2002), John Bowring, Bentham’s literary executor, received a sum of £2,000 to
produce a complete edition of Bentham’s writings. Most of the editorial work was farmed out to
‘disciples’ of Bentham.
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moral theory.3 Sidgwick admitted that his own ‘general view of Politics’ had been
‘originally derived from the writings of Bentham and J.S. Mill’, and noted that ‘the
earlier portion’ of his Elements of Politics, dealing ‘with the principles of legislation’,
was ‘to a considerable extent composed on the lines of Bentham’s Principles of the
Civil Code’.4
Sidgwick, moreover, was so concerned by what he perceived to be the
inadequate account of Bentham’s thought given by Leslie Stephen in History of
English Thought in the Eighteenth Century5 that he produced an essay on ‘Bentham
and Benthamism in Politics and Ethics’ for the Fortnightly Review of May 1877.
Sidgwick complained that Bentham had been ‘treated with somewhat contemptuous
brevity in [Stephen’s] chapter on Moral Philosophy; while in the following chapter on
Political Theories’ he had been ‘barely mentioned’. Sidgwick would not have taken it
upon himself ‘to supply this deficiency’ had Bentham’s thought been of ‘merely
historical interest’, but, on the contrary, ‘his system’ remained ‘an important element
of our current political thought’.6 Sidgwick was unconvinced by Stephen’s excuse that
Benthamism belonged to the nineteenth century, and so was outside the scope of a
study of eighteenth-century thought. In Sidgwick’s view, Bentham was the pre-
eminent representative of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and Benthamism was
‘the legacy left to the nineteenth century by the eighteenth’, being the force against
3 See, for instance, ‘Bentham’, in Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, The Collected Works of John
Stuart Mill, vol. X, ed. J.M. Robson, Toronto, 1969, pp. 75–115, at pp. 98–9. Sidgwick thought that
some parts of the text were authentic Bentham, while other parts reflected Bowring’s views.
4 Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics, 2nd edn., London, 1897 (the first edition appeared in 1891),
pp. v–vi. For ‘Principles of the Civil Code’ see Bowring, i. 297–364.
5 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols., London, 1876, Ch. IX,
paras. 136–40.
6 Henry Sidgwick, ‘Bentham and Benthamism in Politics and Ethics’, in Miscellaneous Essays and
Addresses, London, 1904, pp. 135–69, at p. 135.
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which the newer ‘philosophy of Restoration and Reaction has had to struggle
continually with varying success’.7 Sidgwick went on to complain that Stephen
has hardly enough recognised that Bentham’s originality and importance lay
not in his verbal adoption of utility as an end and standard of right political
action, but in his real exclusion of any other standard; in the definiteness with
which he conceived the ‘general good’; the clearness and precision with which
he analysed it into its empirically ascertainable constituents; the exhaustive and
methodical consistency with which he applied this one standard to all
departments of practice; and the rigour with which he kept its application free
from all alien elements.8
Sidgwick went on to criticize Stephen for not appreciating the significance of
Bentham’s contribution to political theory. Bentham had replaced the ‘metaphysico-
jural dissertations’ of the eighteenth century with a theory that was ‘exclusively
positive and unmetaphysical, at the same time that it is still confidently deductive and
unhistorical’, and had thereby formed ‘the natural transition from the “Age of Reason”
to the period of political thought in which we are now living’.9
There was much in Bentham’s thought with which Sidgwick agreed. Sidgwick
accepted Bentham’s position that the greatest happiness meant the greatest possible
surplus of pleasure over pain, and that pleasures were capable of being compared
quantitatively.10 Hence, he took Bentham’s side against John Stuart Mill in relation to
the distinction between the quantity and quality of pleasure. Sidgwick noted that
Bentham’s statement that push-pin was as good as poetry, if it produced the same
7 Ibid., pp. 136–7.
8 Ibid., pp. 140–1.
9 Ibid., pp. 154–6.
10 Methods of Ethics, pp. 92, 413.
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amount of pleasure and satisfaction,11 seemed ‘to many offensively paradoxical’. Mill
had abandoned it, and had argued instead that there were qualitative as well as
quantitative differences between pleasures. Sidgwick concluded, however, that ‘in
order to work out consistently the method that takes pleasure as the sole ultimate end
of rational conduct, Bentham’s proposition must be accepted, and all qualitative
comparison of pleasure must really resolve itself into quantitative’. Pleasures, after all,
were linked by the common property of pleasantness.12 Sidgwick agreed with Bentham
(and Mill) that the scope of utilitarianism extended beyond human beings to all
sentient creatures.13 In relation to the distribution of a given quantum of happiness,
Sidgwick endorsed Bentham’s ‘formula’ that everybody was to count for one.14 The
utilitarian principle itself, noted Sidgwick, gave no answer, and thus needed to be
supplemented by a principle of just or right distribution. The principle adopted by most
utilitarians, and one that needed no ‘special justification’, was that of pure equality.15
In ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, having discussed some of the manifold
schemes with which Bentham had involved himself, and particularly his relationship
with Revolutionary France and his efforts to construct a panopticon prison, Sidgwick
argued that ‘the right point of view for understanding [Bentham’s] work in politics and
11 See Jeremy Bentham, ‘The Rationale of Reward’, in Bowring, ii. 189–266, at 253: ‘Prejudice apart,
the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of
push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either.’
12 Methods of Ethics, pp. 93–4.
13 Ibid., p. 414. For Bentham on the welfare of animals see Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of
Jurisprudence, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 2010, pp. 4–5 n.
14 The traditional source for Bentham’s ‘formula’ was Mill’s allusion in Utilitarianism (1861) to
‘Bentham’s dictum “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”’: see Essays on Ethics,
Religion, and Society, p. 258. The source of the quotation was no doubt Bentham’s statement that
‘Every individual in the country tells for one; no individual for more than one’, in Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, specially applied to English practice, ed. J.S. Mill, 5 vols., London, 1827, iv. 475, and
reproduced at Bowring, vii. 334.
15 Methods of Ethics, pp. 416–17, 432. For a statement of Bentham’s to the same effect see Rights,
Representation, and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and other writings on the French Revolution, ed. P.
Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin, and C. Blamires, Oxford, 2002, pp. 72–3. Bentham did, however, put
forward a utilitarian justification for the principle of equality, namely the principle known today as the
principle of diminishing marginal utility: see, for instance, ‘Legislator of the World’: Writings on
Codification, Law, and Education, ed. P. Schofield and J. Harris, Oxford, 1998, pp. 252–3.
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ethics’ was to see it ‘as the central and most important realisation of a dominant and
all-comprehensive desire for the amelioration of human life, or rather of sentient
existence generally’. All Bentham’s schemes and writings, from the most abstract to
the most practical, were aimed at ‘the promotion of happiness’. His works ‘were
written not so much to be read as to be used’, and this accounted for the difficulty of
his style. Hence, ‘the “general reader” has to be warned off from most of Bentham’s
volumes’, although, added Sidgwick, ‘such warning is hardly needed’.16 It was
Bentham’s aim to take the ‘actual’ and ‘to reconstruct [it] systematically on rational
principles’—hence, his interest in ‘[w]hat is’ was ‘always subordinated’ to bringing
about ‘what ought to be’. 17 While stating that William Paley had been the first to
produce ‘a tolerably complete system’ of utilitarian ethics,18 Sidgwick’s opinion was
that Bentham’s utilitarianism had ‘a decided superiority’ in terms of its ‘unity,
consistency, and thoroughness of method’.19 This, for Sidgwick, was a considerable
compliment.20
II
Despite his agreement on so many points with Bentham, and his obvious admiration
for Bentham, Sidgwick did, nevertheless, identify a dilemma, or rather what, in
16 There is some irony here given Sidgwick’s endorsement, however reluctant, of an esoteric morality
described at Methods of Ethics, pp. 485–92. It should be noted that Bentham, despite the perceived
obscurity of his style of writing, was a great advocate of openness and publicity in government.
17 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 149–50.
18 Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, 2nd edn., 1888 (the first edition
appeared in 1886), p. 230. Paley’s work was The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, which
was based on lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge, and which, following its publication in
1785, had established itself as the University’s standard text on the subject.
19 History of Ethics, p. 231.
20 Other points of comparison between Bentham and Sidgwick that might be explored include their
difficulties with being required, at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge respectively, to subscribe
to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and their sympathy for the ancient Greek world’s
attitude towards homosexuality: see B. Schultz, Henry Sidgwick: Eye of the Universe. An Intellectual
Biography, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 16–18, 115–34; L. Crompton, Byron and Greek Love: Homophobia in
19th-century England, London, 1985, pp. 26–53, 252–83; and P. Schofield, Utility and Democracy: the
Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham, Oxford, 2006, pp. 171–6.
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‘Bentham and Benthamism’, he termed a ‘double aspect’, in Bentham’s utilitarianism,
which had resulted in ‘much perplexity both to disciples and to opponents’. The
‘double aspect’ consisted on the one hand in Bentham’s desire to promote the general
happiness, and on the other hand his conviction ‘of the unqualified selfishness of the
vast majority of human beings’.21 Sidgwick claimed that Bentham had found both
doctrines in the work of Helévtius, who had argued, first, that every human being, on
all occasions and at all times, sought his own interest, and second, that what were
termed virtues were qualities useful to the public. In order to promote virtue in these
circumstances, according to Helvétius, the moralist had to turn to legislation, and
thereby harmonise universal self-preference with public utility.22 The problem, then,
was how to ensure that self-interested individuals promoted a non-selfish end, the
happiness of the community as a whole.
The problem of the ‘double aspect’ was restated in Outlines of the History of
Ethics, where Sidgwick dealt with Bentham in his final chapter, entitled ‘Modern,
chiefly English, Ethics’, which began with Francis Bacon and ended with T.H. Green.
Sidgwick treated Bentham as part of a utilitarian school that also included John Gay,
Abraham Tucker, William Paley, and John Stuart Mill, and which he saw as opposed
to an intuitional school that included Richard Price, Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, and
William Whewell. The utilitarians had conflated the two ‘fundamental questions of
morals’, that is ‘What is right?’ and ‘Why should I do it?’, by answering them both by
21 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 150–1. The problem of the ‘double aspect’ of utilitarianism was a
different problem from that of the ‘Dualism of the Practical Reason’ (Methods of Ethics, p. xxi), which
has received so much attention (see, for instance, J.B. Schneewind, Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian
Moral Philosophy, Oxford, 1977, pp. 352–79; and Schultz, Sidgwick, pp. 205–53). The ‘Dualism of the
Practical Reason’ concerns the question as to whether egoistic hedonism (Epicureanism) or
universalistic hedonism (utilitarianism) is the proper basis for ethics. The ‘double aspect’ is the problem
of how, once utilitarianism is accepted as the proper basis for ethics, self-interested individuals can be
brought to do their moral duty. To put this another way, the ‘Dualism of the Practical Reason’ is a
problem within ethics, whereas the ‘double aspect’ is a problem concerning the relationship between
psychology and ethics. There does, however, seem to be significant overlap in Sidgwick’s attempts to
deal with the two problems.
22 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 150–3.
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the use of ‘a single apparently clear notion—pleasure and its negative quantity pain’.
The right action was that which promoted the general happiness, which consisted in a
balance on the side of pleasure over pain, while the reason that one should do it was
‘the effect on the will of the pleasures or pains attached to the observance or violation
of moral rules’—in other words, because of sanctions. Sidgwick argued that there was
no ‘logical connection between the answers that have thus come to be considered as
one doctrine’, and that ‘this apparent unity and simplicity has really hidden
fundamental disagreements’.23
In order to appreciate the exact nature of the problem of the ‘double aspect’ of
utilitarianism, it is helpful to explore Sidgwick’s conception of the is/ought distinction
and the related distinction between the positive sciences and ethics, and his
classification of the main ethical theories. Sidgwick began Methods of Ethics by
explaining that the positive sciences, such as psychology or sociology, were concerned
with what ‘merely is, has been, or will be’, while ethics was concerned with what
individuals ought to do or what it was right for them to do, and politics with what
public officials ought to do. To explain conduct, which was the province of the
positive sciences, was ‘essentially different’ from the attempt to determine what
conduct was right, which was the province of ethics.24 There were only two ends,
argued Sidgwick, which had a strong claim to be regarded as rational ultimate ends of
conduct—in other words, as the proper standard of right and wrong—and these were
happiness and the perfection of human nature. Happiness, as the ultimate end, might be
understood in terms of either individual happiness or universal happiness—the former
was egoistic hedonism or Epicureanism, and the latter universalistic hedonism. This
23 History of Ethics, pp. 227–8.
24 Methods of Ethics, pp. 1–2.
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latter was the doctrine of Bentham and his successors, and was utilitarianism.25 To
hold that perfection was the ultimate end was to hold a version of intuitionism, where
right conduct was determined by reference to axioms of duty that were intuitively
known. Although the doctrines of egoistic hedonism (Epicureanism) and universalistic
hedonism (utilitarianism) were closely related, in that they were both consequentialist,
pleasure-maximizing, and overlapped in their practical recommendations,26 Sidgwick
believed that the practical affinity between utilitarianism and intuitionism was much
greater than that between the two forms of hedonism. Intuitionists regarded the general
happiness as an end to which the rules of morality were the best means. Utilitarianism
was an ally of intuitionism, in that both were opposed to the egoism that Sidgwick
associated with Thomas Hobbes.27
A difficulty arose, however, because universalistic hedonism (utilitarianism)—
the doctrine that the right conduct was that which would produce the greatest amount
of happiness for the whole community—was sometimes confused with egoistic
hedonism—that the right conduct was that which would produce the greatest happiness
of the actor himself—and both were sometimes confused with the psychological
theory that every agent sought his own individual happiness. There was, however, ‘no
necessary connexion between this latter proposition’, which belonged to the positive
science of psychology, ‘and any ethical theory’.28 In similar vein, in his discussion of
the notion of ‘Nature’, Sidgwick noted that every attempt to derive ‘what ought to be’
from ‘what is’ failed. There was no principled way of distinguishing ‘natural impulses’
from ‘unnatural’. All that natural meant in this context was common as opposed to
rare, or original as opposed to later. It was impossible to extract ‘a definite practical
25 Ibid., pp. 9–11.
26 Ibid., pp. 83–4.
27 Ibid., pp. 85–6.
28 Ibid., pp. 411–12.
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criterion of the rightness of actions’ from the notion of Nature.29 Psychology belonged
to nature, and could not form the basis for ethics.
In History of Ethics, Sidgwick discussed the attempts that had been made to
solve the problem of the ‘double aspect’. Having determined what the best action
might be, he noted, the next question was—how was a man to be made to do it? These
were, of course, the ‘two fundamental questions of morals’. How did Bentham, for
instance, reconcile his view that the proper end of action of the individual was his own
greatest happiness, with his view that the proper standard of right and wrong was the
greatest happiness of the greatest number? Sidgwick explained that Bentham relied on
the four sanctions he had identified, namely the physical, the political including the
legal, the moral or popular, and the religious, which were the source of pains and
pleasures, and thereby constituted motives to action.30 The religious sanction did not
introduce the notion of ‘the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being as a means of
logically connecting individual and general happiness’, commented Sidgwick, but
rather referred to religious hopes and fears as they operated on the minds of
individuals, and hence Bentham had retained ‘mundane experience’ as the ‘plain and
palpable basis’ of his ‘system’. While this avoided ‘the disputable inferences from
nature and Scripture in which Paley’s system is involved’, the ‘gain is dearly
purchased’, for there was no guarantee that the sanctions, by which the moral rules
which promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest number were enforced, would be
adequate.
Sidgwick reconstructed Bentham’s position from two passages from Bowring’s
‘Memoirs of Bentham’ in order to highlight what he saw as the deficiency or
contradiction in Bentham’s thought. Sidgwick asked:
29 Ibid., pp. 81, 83.
30 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J.H. Burns and
H.L.A. Hart, London, 1970, pp. 34–7.
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How does Bentham reconcile the proposition that the ‘constantly proper end of
action on the part of every individual at the moment of action is his real
greatest happiness from that moment to the end of life,’ with the acceptance of
the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’ as a ‘plain but true standard for
whatever is right and wrong in the field of morals?’31
The first of Sidgwick’s quotations came from a passage which Bowring appears to
have taken directly from one of Bentham’s original manuscripts, and the second from
the record of a conversation he had with Bentham.32 The key quotation is the first,
which is evidently taken from a marginal summary sheet. Bentham wrote summaries
of the content of his text in the margin of the text sheets, and then had these summaries
copied onto marginal summary sheets. These sheets gave him a concise statement of
the content of the text itself, and thereby aided him in organizing the structure of the
work in question. Sidgwick’s quotation is taken from the second marginal summary of
a sequence of seventeen. The first four marginal summary paragraphs in this sequence
are given by Bowring as follows:
1. Constantly actual end of action on the part of every individual at the moment
of action, his greatest happiness, according to his view of it at that moment.
2. Constantly proper end of action on the part of every individual at the
moment of action, his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of
his life. See Deontology private.
3. Constantly proper end of action on the part of every individual
considered as trustee for the community, of which he is considered as a
member, the greatest happiness of that same community, in so far as depends
upon the interest which forms the bond of union between its members.
31 History of Ethics, p. 235.
32 See Bowring, x. 560 and 79 respectively.
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4. Constantly proper end of action on the part of an individual, having a
share in the power of legislation in and for an independent community, termed
a political state, the greatest happiness of the greatest number of its members.
The contrast being drawn by Bentham was between the end of private ethics, where
the only person affected by an action was the actor himself, and the end of public
ethics, where the actor was a public official, and hence in a position of trust. Bentham
was not stating that the proper end of each individual’s action was his own greatest
happiness and, at the same time, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which
would have been to contradict himself. There was, indeed, a connection between the
greatest happiness of the individual and the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
in that the latter was made up of the aggregate happiness of the individuals that
composed the community in question. Nevertheless, the point remains that Sidgwick
misinterpreted this passage by assuming that this was a full statement of Bentham’s
position, rather than a summary of certain axioms which formed the basis for his
theory of constitutional law, and by ignoring the distinction Bentham was making
between private and public ethics. As we shall see in more detail below, Bentham’s
fully expressed view was that the actual end of each individual’s action was
predominantly, but not universally, his own happiness, but that there was plenty of
scope for ‘other-regarding’ actions, where the actor’s intention was to promote the
happiness of persons other than himself.
Sidgwick continued by claiming that Bentham did not give any ‘complete
answer’ to the problem of the ‘double aspect’ in any of his published works. On the
contrary, in his legislative and constitutional writings, Bentham tended to assume that
the happiness, or interests, of individuals would clash, unless there was some
adjustment made to their prudential (i.e. self-interested) calculations by the use of
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punishment. ‘But obviously’, continued Sidgwick, ‘on this assumption a satisfactory
system of private conduct on utilitarian principles cannot be constructed until
legislative and constitutional reform has been perfected’. Bentham’s strategy, argued
Sidgwick, was rather to impress on individuals the extent to which their own happiness
was promoted by measures that contributed to the general happiness.33
By not giving a ‘completely reasoned account’ of what men ought to do,
argued Sidgwick, Bentham had left a ‘gap’ in his system that his ‘disciples’ had either
ignored or attempted to fill. Some had argued that a man always promoted his own
happiness by promoting that of others; John Austin had returned to Paley’s doctrine
and founded utilitarian morality on the will of God; George Grote had limited the duty
to promote the greatest happiness; while John Stuart Mill had advocated ‘an
unqualified subordination of private to general happiness’.34 In short, the history of
utilitarian ethics since Bentham had been dominated by the need to provide a
convincing account of moral obligation—why it was that self-interested individuals
should strive to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Sidgwick
concluded that neither Bentham nor Mill had provided an adequate account of moral
obligation, and could not do so without abandoning the ‘purely empirical basis’ of
their utilitarianism.
Sidgwick gave a similar account in ‘Bentham and Benthamism’. Bentham’s
theory of virtue, derived from Helvétius, had two aspects, the psychological and the
ethical. From the psychological point of view, ‘common morality’ was ‘the simple
result of common selfishness’. Hence, each man approved of what he thought useful to
him, and the public, which was ‘merely an aggregate of individuals’, approved of what
it thought useful to the public. As well as failing to explain why men’s moral
33 History of Ethics, pp. 233–6. As we shall see, Bentham’s strategy was precisely as Sidgwick
suggested—namely, to perfect legislative and constitutional reform.
34 Ibid., pp. 236–7.
Schofield—Sidgwick on Bentham—13/12/2012—Page 13
judgements agreed to the extent that they did, the theory failed to provide any rational
account of the ‘transition’ from an egoistic psychology to the ethical principle that the
standard of right and wrong was public utility. Bentham did not, in fact, try to maintain
that there was, said Sidgwick, but rather just admitted that he simply approved of the
principle of utility: ‘he aims at the general happiness because he happens to prefer it’.35
The utilitarian moralist might compose a moral code which would provide guidance to
those already committed to utilitarian morality, but since such persons were so few in
number, ‘it would hardly be worth while to print a book for them’. For Sidgwick, ‘the
practically important question’ was how the utilitarian moralist should deal with ‘the
great mass of mankind’ who were not motivated by a desire to promote the general
happiness.
One answer had been provided by Paley and Austin, who had treated ‘the rules
of utilitarian duty as a code of Divine Law, adequately supported by religious
sanctions’. Bentham had not endorsed this approach, though he had not ‘expressly
excluded’ it.36 There were two further options, both of which, ‘from a utilitarian point
of view’, were ‘perfectly appropriate’. One option, which Sidgwick did not attribute to
Bentham, was to argue that duty and happiness would always coincide in practice.37
Sidgwick pointed out that, had Bentham taken this approach, his emphasis in
Constitutional Code on the self-preference of monarchs and aristocrats would not have
35 Bentham did indeed state that it was his desire that rulers took the greatest happiness of the greatest
number as the end of government: see First Principles preparatory to Constitutional Code, ed. P.
Schofield, Oxford, 1989 p. 230. For him to have admitted, however, that he was a partisan of the
principle of utility merely because he liked it would have placed him on a level with the partisans of the
rival principle of sympathy and antipathy, who elevated their personal likes and dislikes into the
standard of right and wrong. It was the objective, ‘external’ aspect of the principle of utility that
distinguished it from other, plausible ethical theories, all of which fell under the general category of the
principle of sympathy and antipathy. The principle of asceticism, where the right and proper end of
action was the promotion of pain and the avoidance of pleasure, was not a plausible theory, in that any
attempt to pursue it systematically would quickly turn earth into ‘hell’. See An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 21–31.
36 Sidgwick does not appear to have appreciated the strength of Bentham’s opposition to religion: see,
for instance, P. Schofield, Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed, London, 2009, pp. 116–36.
37 Sidgwick conceded that this position was maintained in Bowring’s edition of Bentham’s Deontology,
but attributed it to Bowring, who was ‘an enthusiastic and not very clear-headed disciple’.
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made sense, and there would have been no need for the artificial identification of
interests that he had recommended.38 The other option was to offer the utilitarian code
‘to mankind as a standard for rectifying their ordinary judgments of approbation and
disapprobation, clearing them from a certain amount of confusion and conflict which
now perplexes them, and so increasing their beneficent effect’. This view was implicit
in Bentham’s treatment of the moral sanction, and ‘was the view taken by James Mill’.
Bentham, however, went beyond the view that private ethics consisted in merely ‘the
art of praising or blaming’, to the view that men should be shown the ways in which
their duty often coincided with their interest. The more important part of this
coincidence was to be enforced by the legislator, while the moralist would ‘exhibit the
minor supplementary prescriptions of duty’.39
Sidgwick believed that Bentham had created the problem of the ‘double aspect’
by including both a psychological and an ethical dimension in his utilitarianism.
Bentham, and after him John Stuart Mill, had then failed to deal adequately with the
problem. According to Sidgwick, from Bentham’s psychological doctrine, that every
human being aimed at his own greatest happiness, it seemed to follow that it was
‘useless’ to point out to a man the conduct that would promote the general happiness,
unless he was convinced that it would promote his own. ‘Hence on this view’, noted
Sidgwick, ‘egoistic and hedonistic considerations must necessarily be combined in any
practical treatment of morality’, and it would not be surprising to find ‘Bentham or his
disciples’ attempting to base universalistic hedonism, of which they approved, on the
egoism which they saw as a necessary feature of human nature. And so it was that
John Stuart Mill had tried ‘to establish a logical connexion between the psychological
and ethical principles he holds in common with Bentham’, and had argued that,
38 See further below.
39 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 164–8.
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because each man sought his own happiness, he ought to seek the happiness of
others.40
How did Sidgwick himself deal with the second of the two ‘fundamental
questions’ of ethics, that is how to make a man do his duty? It should at the beginning
be noted that Sidgwick did not accept the egoistic psychology which he attributed to
Bentham and the utilitarians. He argued that men were not motivated by the desire for
selfish pleasure alone, but were also motivated by other ‘impulses’ that might include
‘the love of virtue for its own sake, or desire to do what is right as such’.41 Sidgwick
believed that there existed a harmony between ‘the maxim of Prudence and the maxim
of Rational Benevolence’. Rejecting both of the utilitarian solutions to the problem of
the ‘double aspect’, namely the reliance either on sanctions or on the natural harmony
of interests, he appealed to a combination of ‘the moral intuition that the Good of the
whole is reasonably to be preferred to the Good of a part’ and the sense of pain that
accompanied any ‘conscious choice of my own pleasure at the expense of pain or loss
to others’.42 Sidgwick had to admit, however, that an ‘inseparable connexion between
Utilitarian Duty and the greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to it’ could
not be ‘satisfactorily demonstrated on empirical grounds’. It seems that Sidgwick
thought that the only solution was to appeal, like utilitarians such as Paley and Austin,
to the existence of an afterlife in which a utilitarian God would distribute rewards and
punishments according to the merit or demerit of the individual’s actions in the present
life. The utilitarian code was conceived as the law of God, who had commanded men
to promote the general happiness. The rational egoist who accepted this proposition
40 Methods of Ethics, pp. 84–5. Sidgwick was alluding to Mill’s statement in Utilitarianism that, ‘No
reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes
it to be attainable, desires his own happiness’: see Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, p. 234.
41 Methods of Ethics, p. 52.
42 Ibid., pp. 498–500. In ‘the brief history’, Sidgwick stated that he had eventually come to the view that
the utilitarian ethic was founded on an ‘a fundamental intuition’: see ibid., pp. xxii–xxiii.
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needed ‘no further inducement to frame his life on Utilitarian principles’. But how,
asked Sidgwick, was the conviction of the existence of God obtained? The answer was
that it was obtained either through revelation, or through reason, or through both. If
through reason, then ethics and theology were so closely connected that they could not
be clearly separated.43 It might be objected that the happiness of sentient beings was
‘so imperfectly attained’ in the actual world, that universal happiness could not be
conceived to be God’s end, unless God was not considered to be omnipotent. In
response, it might be argued that ‘the quantum of happiness ultimately attained’ in the
universe was at its maximum. This, however, was a position for the theologian to
develop. Whatever the case, there was no argument from natural theology that opposed
the view that happiness was the ultimate good.44 There was, in other words, no
theological reason for rejecting utilitarianism. But neither did ethics as such provide a
totally satisfactory account of why men should do their duty.
Viewed in the context of his accounts in ‘Bentham and Benthamism’ and the
History of Ethics, Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics was, in an important sense, an attempt
to deal with the problem of the ‘double aspect’ which had been highlighted by his
reading of Bentham: namely how to provide an adequate inducement for self-
interested individuals to promote the general happiness. Yet, in the end, it seems
plausible to argue that not only did Sidgwick find the problem in Bentham, but also
found there a large part of the solution, insofar as there was a solution without
trespassing into theology. A utilitarian system of morality (including that of Bentham),
stated Sidgwick, could still be used in various ways, irrespective of whether the
sanctions it provided were adequate. First, it could offer ‘practical guidance’ to those
who, for whatever reason, had chosen the utilitarian principle as the ‘ultimate end’ of
43 Ibid., pp. 503–4.
44 Ibid., pp. 505–6.
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their conduct. Second, it could point out those areas where there was a coincidence
between individual and general interest. Third, it could provide a standard by which
the conduct of others might be praised or blamed, even though men might not be
prepared to act upon it themselves. ‘We may regard morality’, noted Sidgwick, ‘as a
kind of supplementary legislation, supported by public opinion, which we may expect
the public, when duly enlightened, to frame in accordance with the public interest.’45
These were strategies which, as we have seen, Sidgwick attributed to Bentham or his
‘disciples’. In a very real sense, Sidgwick was operating within the parameters of
Bentham’s thought, and was, on the question of the relationship of duty to interest,
more of a ‘Benthamite’ than a ‘Millian’. It had been Bentham who had provided a
rigorous and systematic account of the proper ethical standard, had successfully
analysed the notion of happiness into its constituent elements of pleasure, and had, in
fact, developed as plausible a strategy as could be found for bringing men to do their
duty. Indeed, Bentham’s solution to the problem, as described by Sidgwick, seems to
fall little short of Sidgwick’s solution—once it is accepted that an appeal to God is out
of bounds for the ethical philosopher. Ultimately, however, Sidgwick seemed to think
that, without God, no strategy could be entirely successful.
III
Stepping back from Sidgwick’s account of Bentham, and viewing matters now from
Bentham’s perspective, Bentham would have rejected Sidgwick’s claim that there was
no necessary connection between psychology and ethics, and would have disputed
Sidgwick’s claim that he was committed to the view that the individual always acted in
a completely self-interested manner. Bentham’s ethical theory had a ‘naturalistic’
45 History of Ethics, pp. 239–40.
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basis, in that it was founded on the existence of pleasure and pain, which were what
Bentham termed ‘real entities’—in other words, pleasure and pain had a physical
existence. For Bentham, Sidgwick’s claim that the right action was that which
produced the general happiness, consisting in the maximum amount of pleasure and
the minimum amount of pain, while at the same time denying that ethics had a physical
or natural basis, would have been nonsense. In An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, Bentham outlined the way in which a particular ‘lot’ of
pleasure or pain could be measured. Considered from the point of view of a single
individual, the quantity, and hence the value, of any particular pain or pleasure
depended on the product of four elements or circumstances, namely intensity, duration,
certainty, and propinquity. When an action which produced pleasure or pain was being
considered, two further circumstances had to be taken into account, namely fecundity
(the chance of the pleasure or pain being followed by sensations of the same kind) and
purity (the chance of the pleasure or pain not being followed by sensations of the
opposite kind). Where more than one individual was concerned, a seventh element or
circumstance that had to be taken into account was extent, that is the pleasures and
pains of the whole number of persons affected by the action in question. An action was
right, or good, or proper, insofar as it produced a balance of pleasure over pain when
all seven circumstances were taken into account. It was wrong, or evil, or improper,
insofar as it produced a balance of pain over pleasure.46 The ethical standard
represented by the principle of utility was, therefore, grounded in the physical
experiences of pleasures and pains distributed among each and every person affected
by the action in question.
46 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, pp. 38–41.
Schofield—Sidgwick on Bentham—13/12/2012—Page 19
In stating that Bentham was committed to the view that each individual was
totally self-interested, Sidgwick misrepresented Bentham’s position. Sidgwick stated:
If, as Bentham affirms, ‘on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human
being is’ inevitably ‘led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his
view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree
contributory to his own greatest happiness,’ then, to any one who knows this, it
must become inconceivable that Reason dictates to him to pursue any other line
of conduct.47
The work from which this quotation is taken, edited by Richard Doane, formerly an
amanuensis of Bentham, formed an introduction for the version of Constitutional Code
that appeared in the Bowring edition.48 Doane amalgamated material from several
different essays, written at different times, some of which were not composed for
Constitutional Code, in order to create chapters devoted to particular themes, for
instance corruption, public opinion, and titles of honour. The result was a hotchpotch,
which did not faithfully reproduce Bentham’s intentions. The section in which the
passage quoted by Sidgwick appears originally formed part of an essay entitled
‘Constitutional Code Rationale’ which is now published in authoritative form in First
Principles preparatory to Constitutional Code. When the version of the text in the
Bowring edition is compared with that in First Principles, one finds that the very
sentence which Sidgwick quotes is omitted from the latter. This is because the
sentence in question was interpolated by Doane from an earlier draft of the section.49
Aside from these editorial matters, Bentham’s purpose in the sentence in question was
47 Methods of Ethics, p. 41.
48 Sidgwick gives as his source for the quotation ‘Constitutional Code, Introduction, § 2’ (see Methods
of Ethics, p. 41 n.), i.e. Bowring, ix. 5. The equivalent section now appears in Jeremy Bentham, First
Principles preparatory to Constitutional Code, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 1989, pp. 232–7, though, as
explained below, without the specific sentence quoted by Sidgwick.
49 The original manuscript is at University College London Library, Bentham Papers, Box xxxvi, fo. 83.
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to give an exposition of the ‘principle of self-preference’. He was not stipulating that
each and every human being was on each and every occasion motivated purely by self-
preference. His argument, in fact, was not that each person was ‘inevitably’
(Sidgwick’s addition) led to pursue his self-interest, irrespective of its impact on the
general interest, but rather that self-preference was the ‘predominant’ motive in human
nature. This meant that, as far as the legislator was concerned, the only sensible
assumption on which to ground a code of law was that people in general would be
motivated by self-preference. It also meant that, as rulers were, from this psychological
perspective, no different from any other members of the community, they had to be
treated by constitutional law in exactly the same way as subjects were treated by penal
and civil law.
Bentham’s wider purpose in the section in which this sentence was interpolated
was to outline, in very broad terms, the general principles on which a representative
democracy was founded, the only form of government capable of promoting the
general interest. Bentham noted that, ‘The right and proper end of government in every
political community is the greatest happiness of all the individuals of which it is
composed’. The actual end of government, however, was the greatest happiness of
rulers. The conflict between the right end and the actual end of government constituted
a natural opposition of interests. Hence a third principle was necessary—the junction-
of-interests-prescribing principle—by which the natural opposition of interests was
replaced by an artificial identification of interests. It was the purpose of constitutional
law to bring about this artificial identification of interests, and it was achieved by
placing rulers in such a situation that the only means they possessed of promoting their
own interest was through promoting the general interest. Each person, including each
ruler, had, as well as their predominant self-interest, a share in the general interest. The
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ruler’s ability to promote his self-interest by measures opposed to the general interest
was removed or neutralized, leaving him with the ability to promote his self-interest
only through the promotion of his share in the general interest.50
That this was Bentham’s considered position in his later constitutional writings
can be further instanced by reference to a passage written in 1822 in an essay advising
the Spanish to relinquish their claims to their overseas possessions. Bentham noted that
it had been the endeavour of every person in possession of political power to advance
their own particular interest, and thereby to engage in the sinister sacrifice, whereby
the general interest was sacrificed to the particular interest of the rulers.
Such, therefore, in every country, and at every time, has been, and will be, the
case with the ruling few in their dealings with the subject many. To this
endeavour, by nothing but the view of inability can any effectual bar be
opposed: nor, in this case, can any bar be effectual other than a power, on the
part of the subject many, to remove the ruling few from their respective
situations: and this, with a degree of promptitude, sufficient, in every instance,
to anticipate the consummation of the sinister sacrifice.
There was nothing to be gained from pointing out some extraordinary sacrifice made
by rulers of their particular interest in favour of the general interest, since it was ‘to the
general tenor of human conduct, and not to any extraordinary deviations from it, that,
on pain of being ineffectual, all such arrangements must be adapted’. Given the
infrequency of this sort of sacrifice, ‘the only supposition that, on any given occasion,
can, in regard to any one man so situated, be rationally entertained and acted upon,
is—that, in his instance, it is by his self-regarding interest, according to his own
conception of it at the time, that his conduct will be determined’. This was the very
50 First Principles, pp. 232–7. For Bentham’s constitutional theory see F. Rosen, Jeremy Bentham and
Representative Democracy: A Study of the Constitutional Code, Oxford, 1983; and Schofield, Utility
and Democracy, pp. 250–303.
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same basis on which rulers proceeded when attaching punishment and reward to the
provisions of the penal and civil law. Given that this was the way they acted when
exercising power over the subject many, they could not argue that they should be
treated any differently when constitutional law was applied to them.51 Bentham’s point
was not that every person, at all times, was motivated by self-interest, but rather that
this was the only sensible basis on which to proceed when legislating, whether that
legislation was aimed at subjects generally (penal and civil law) or at rulers
(constitutional law). Moreover, he believed that interests could be so arranged—in
particular by a democratic political structure—that individuals did have sufficient
motives to promote the general interest, and thereby solve the problem of the ‘double
aspect’. It is worth reiterating that the problem of the ‘double aspect’ was not so acute
when self-interest was viewed as ‘predominant’ rather than as ‘inevitable’.
Having said that, Sidgwick did, in fact, recognize that this strategy of the
identification of the interests of rulers and subjects had been adopted by Bentham in
his later constitutional writings.52 Sidgwick pointed out that ‘the rational basis of
[Bentham’s] constitutional construction ... consists in a few very natural inferences
from the ethical and psychological premises on which his whole social activity
proceeded’.
If once we regard the administration of law as a machinery indispensable for
identifying the interest of individuals with the conduct by which they will most
promote the general happiness, so that through a skilful adjustment of rewards
and punishments the universally active force of self-preference is made to
produce the results at which universal benevolence would aim, it is plain that
51 Jeremy Bentham, Colonies, Commerce, and Constitutional Law: Rid Yourselves of Ultramaria and
other writings on Spain and Spanish America, ed. P. Schofield, Oxford, 1995, pp. 34–6.
52 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 156–8. Sidgwick dated the radical phase in Bentham’s career from
the publication of Plan of Parliamentary Reform in 1817, though Bentham had in fact become
committed to political radicalism by 1809: see P. Schofield, Utility and Democracy, pp. 131–40.
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our arrangements are incomplete unless they include means for similarly
regulating the self-preferences of those who are to work and repair the
machine.
The identification of interests would be achieved by the appropriate distribution of
rewards and punishments. The task, noted Sidgwick, was far more difficult in relation
to governors than in relation to private individuals. Bentham’s solution lay in
representative democracy. The identification of interests between governors and
governed was achieved by providing ‘that government, while supreme over
individuals, shall be under the continual vigilant control of the citizens acting
collectively’. Bentham’s supreme legislature was not ‘a majestic incarnation of the
sovereignty of the people; it is merely a collection of agents, appointed by the people
to manage a certain part of their concerns, liable, like other agents, to legal punishment
if they can be proved to have violated their trust, and to instant dismissal if it seem
probable that they have done so’.53 Sidgwick, however, thought that Bentham was
ultimately unsuccessful in reconciling self-interest with general happiness:
unless a little more sociality is allowed to an average human being, the problem
of combining these egoists into an organisation for promoting their common
happiness is like the old task of making ropes of sand. The difficulty that
Hobbes vainly tried to settle summarily by absolute despotism is hardly likely
to be overcome by the democratic artifices of his more inventive successor.54
53 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 158–60.
54 Ibid., p. 163. On Sidgwick’s reasons for rejecting Bentham’s account of sanctions as a satisfactory
solution to the problem of reconciling interest and duty see R. Harrison, ‘The Sanctions of
Utilitarianism’, in R. Harrison, ed., Henry Sidgwick, Oxford, 2001, pp. 93–116. Harrison describes
Bentham’s turn to democracy as a ‘political solution’ to a moral problem, but as R. Crisp points out
(‘Sanctions in Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick’, ibid., pp. 117–22, at p. 119), this is to overlook Bentham’s
further appeal to the moral sanction. It might be added that Bentham viewed politics, or legislation, as a
branch of morals. It might be further added that Harrison views the problem from the perspective of the
‘Dualism of the Practical Reason’ rather from that of the ‘double aspect’ of utilitarianism.
Schofield—Sidgwick on Bentham—13/12/2012—Page 24
If all that was needed was ‘more sociality’, then Bentham’s psychology was able to
provide it. Despite Sidgwick’s characterization, Bentham was not a psychological
egoist, and left considerable scope within human nature for the operation of sympathy
and benevolence.55
IV
One area where Sidgwick and Bentham appear to be significantly at odds is in relation
to the morality of common sense or intuitionism. Sidgwick’s view was that
utilitarianism and the morality of common sense were partners rather than rivals. It had
only been since Bentham, argued Sidgwick, that utilitarianism had been regarded as
opposed to common sense. In contrast, earlier exponents of the doctrine, such as
Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hume, and Smith (Sidgwick was generous in his
appropriation of moralists to the utilitarian tradition), had seen a coincidence.
Sidgwick thought that the morality of common sense tended towards utilitarian
conclusions, even though, he admitted, there was ‘a great difference’ between the
intuitionist assertion that virtue would produce happiness, and the utilitarian view that
the right action was that which would produce the greatest happiness. Had there been
an exact coincidence between the morality of common sense and the dictates of
utilitarianism, the latter would be redundant. But there was no such exact coincidence,
and so utilitarianism could be seen as ‘the scientifically complete and systematically
reflective form’ of the morality of common sense.56 In short, common sense enshrined
an inchoate striving for the greatest happiness, and was essentially in harmony with the
dictates of utility. Utilitarianism was common sense rendered coherent, consistent, and
55 See, for instance, Jeremy Bentham, Deontology together with A Table of the Springs of Action and
Article on Utilitarianism, ed. A. Goldworth, Oxford, 1983, pp. 196–207 ; Schofield, Bentham: A Guide
for the Perplexed, pp. 53–8.
56 Methods of Ethics, pp. 423–5.
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complete. In turn, common sense provided a body of utilitarian doctrine, whose
obscurities and conflicts could be clarified and settled by reference to the utilitarian
standard.57 In the end, it was common sense that provided the basis for utilitarianism
itself, since the basis for ethics was ‘a strong disposition to accept’ propositions
‘commonly taken to be universally true’, and ‘indispensable to the systematic
coherence of our beliefs’.58
Sidgwick contended that his approach was very different to that adopted by
Bentham, whose attempt to produce a perfect utilitarian system was beset with
difficulties. It was ‘prima facie absurd to lay down a set of ideal Utilitarian rules for
mankind generally’.59 The problem was that, were the morality of ‘an average
Englishman’ to be abstracted, what would remain would be ‘an entity so purely
hypothetical, that it is not clear what practical purpose can be served by constructing a
system of moral rules for the community of such beings’. The moralist had no option
but to deal with the men who existed at present, with their existing ‘moral habits,
impulses, and tastes’, living in conditions as they presently existed or might exist in the
immediately foreseeable future, and recognize that such men could be altered only in
limited ways and to a limited degree.60 The utilitarian could not ‘construct a morality
de novo either for man as he is (abstracting his morality), or for man as he ought to be
and will be. He must start ... with the existing social order, and the existing morality as
a part of that order’.61 The only practical way forward was to improve the existing,
imperfect moral order. This was to be achieved by comparing the total amounts of
57 Ibid., pp. 460–1.
58 Ibid., p. 509.
59 Ibid., pp. 467–8.
60 Ibid., pp. 468–9.
61 Ibid., pp. 473–4.
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pleasure and pain expected to result from maintaining an existing rule as opposed to
that expected from the introduction of a new rule.62
But even here, Sidgwick was not, perhaps, so far from Bentham as he
imagined, in that Bentham recognized the overarching importance of the security of
expectations—that is expectations based on the existing order of things—as a
component of human happiness. Bentham’s most radical proposal for the promotion of
equality by the redistribution of wealth was to extend the law of escheat, in particular
by the appropriation of collateral successions. The advantage of this proposal was that
a degree of equality could be achieved without upsetting existing expectations.63
Bentham’s proposal to this effect was fully and explicitly endorsed by Sidgwick in
Elements of Politics.64
An irony, in relation to the problem of the ‘double aspect’ of utilitarianism, was
that, in A Fragment on Government, Bentham had been the first to explore
systematically the distinction between what is and what ought to be. Bentham had
distinguished between expository and censorial jurisprudence, the former concerned
with law as it is, and the latter with law as it ought to be.65 Sidgwick knew this, noting
that, in his endeavour to bring about the ‘union of morals and legislation’, Bentham
had, in A Fragment on Government, separated the study of what exists from that of
what ought to be, which he had found to be hopelessly confused in Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England.66 A further irony is that Bentham did not, in
fact, regard his psychological theory—that each person is motivated by a desire for
62 Ibid., pp. 476–7.
63 See Jeremy Bentham, ‘Supply without Burthen; or Escheat vice Taxation’ (1793), in Bowring, ii.
585–98.
64 Elements of Politics, pp. 105–8.
65 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J.H. Burns
and H.L.A. Hart, London, 1977, pp. 397–8.
66 ‘Bentham and Benthamism’, pp. 153–4. Harrison, ‘Sanctions of Utilitarianism’, p. 103, states that
Sidgwick believed that Mill had mistakenly derived the ‘is’ from the ‘ought’, but that Bentham did not,
for Bentham held that ‘the descriptive psychology’ was ‘quite distinct from the evaluative ethics’. If this
was indeed Sidgwick’s view, then once again it places Sidgwick closer to Bentham than to Mill.
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pleasure and an aversion to pain—as part of his utilitarianism. He was totally clear that
the principle of utility was an ethical standard and an ethical standard alone, albeit
grounded in the ‘real entities’ of pleasure and pain. In short, Bentham would have
recognized the problem of the ‘double aspect’ to the extent that the relationship
between psychology and ethics needed to be explained, but he would have claimed that
he had provided a rigorous and convincing exposition of that relationship.
In conclusion, it is worth reiterating two main points. The first is that, despite
his statement that he was a ‘disciple to Mill’, in his ethics Sidgwick adopted a position
which was, in many important respects, closer to that of Bentham. The second is that
Sidgwick failed to grasp that Bentham’s view of human psychology was not egoistic,
and that the problem of the ‘double aspect’ of utilitarianism, at least as far as Bentham
was concerned, did not exist as such. Bentham recognized that the legislator had to
deal with predominantly self-interested individuals, and hence aimed to bring about the
identification of interests by means of penal, civil, and constitutional law, and, it
should be added, by the influence of an enlightened public opinion. From Sidgwick’s
point of view, however, even if he had been able to accept that Bentham had dealt
adequately with the problem of the ‘double aspect’ of utilitarianism, the problem of the
‘Dualism of the Practical Reason’ would have remained. Having said that, the
problems were closely related, and it might have been the case that had Sidgwick
found in Bentham more resources for dealing with the former, he might have been less
pessimistic in his own ability to deal with the latter. A good deal of the difficulty in
finding such resources lay with Bentham himself for his haphazard approach to the
publication of his writings, but also with the inadequacies of the nineteenth-century
editors who contributed to the Bowring edition. Had Sidgwick, for instance, had access
to a reliable and authoritative edition of Bentham’s writings, it is possible that his
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assessment of Bentham would have been even more insightful and sympathetic, and
the subsequent development of the utilitarian tradition even richer and more powerful.
